Policymaking and Learning Actors, or Is A ’Double Movement’ In Cognition Possible?

Paolo Ramazzotti

Temi di discussione n. 26

Febbraio 2005
Policymaking and Learning Actors, or Is A ’Double Movement’ In Cognition Possible?

Paolo Ramazzotti

Abstract

One of the key issues in K. Polanyi’s (1944, 1957) work is that capitalist markets may be inconsistent with societal values. This (external) inconsistency eventually leads to a reaction against the rationale of the market, what Polanyi refers to with the notion of the double movement. The double movement, in turn, may disrupt the (internal) consistency of the market, thereby leading to dramatic consequences for society, as was the case with fascism and nazism. A crucial question therefore is how to achieve a protective response without undermining society. The paper contends that the two types of (in)consistency basically depend on the shared knowledge available in a given society. It therefore discusses how that knowledge arises and how actors may favor or prevent change by acting on learning processes. The aim is to stress that a policy for change not only requires a scientific perspective that is not restricted within disciplinary boundaries, it also requires a dialogue between social scientists, policy-makers and all those sections of society who can be affected by a change in the status quo.

Paolo Ramazzotti, Università di Macerata, Italy.
E-mail: ramazzotti@unimc.it.
"The image not only makes society, society continually remakes the image"
(Boulding 1956, p. 64)

1 Introduction

The aim of the present paper is to draw on the insights of two major scholars - K. Polanyi and H. Simon - to discuss the nature of public policy when procedurally rational actors base their learning processes on mutually inconsistent value systems. The attempt is to understand if there is a way out of the apparent pendulum between economic constraints to social reform and societal pressures for a humane society.

One of the key issues in K. Polanyi’s (1944, 1957) work is the divergence between economic and societal values in modern capitalism. This divergence, which arises as a result of the peculiarity of the market as a system that tends towards self-regulation, eventually leads to a reaction against the rationale of the market, what Polanyi refers to with the notion of the double movement. Precisely because the double movement contrasts the self-regulating features of the market, it may disrupt it and, in so doing, it may lead to dramatic consequences for society, as was the case with fascism and nazism. It is therefore necessary to discuss whether this need be the case and how it might be avoided. In this perspective, the section that follows provides a synthetic outline of Polanyi’s main tenets and discusses the bounds that may preclude the double movement.

In the first instance, these bounds are the same outlined by neoclassical economic theory, whereby economic policy - thus also action associated to the double movement - may improve equity but at a cost, i.e. by reducing allocative efficiency. The key issue in this approach is that society cannot interfere with the coordinating function of the market, which is based on the information transmitting mechanism provided by relative prices. Based on H. Simon’s work, I argue in section 3 that actors do not merely process information, they need to interpret it. Interpretation, however, need not be the same among actors, and this may preclude the internal consistency of the market as well as the overall consistency of society. Coordination within the market and in society requires a commonly accepted interpretative framework: a broadly intended shared knowledge must act as a meta-coordinating instance.

Shared knowledge in modern capitalism, however, is strongly influenced by the interests of business. In section 4 I argue that business acts upon the interpretative frameworks of other actors through propaganda but, above
all, through the establishment of institutions that eventually provide the 
guidelines for learning processes.

The general implication the above discussion leads to is that policy must 
be concerned with how actors learn. Its action should focus not only on the 
material effects of economic and institutional change but also on the effects 
that it produces on learning. In this sense, section 5 argues that what type 
of knowledge policy pursues depends on which features of the status quo it 
deems open to change. Insofar as it is not marginal change it is pursuing, 
policy must conceive of itself as a co-creator of a change-oriented knowledge. 
What kind of knowledge it fosters depends on what learning it deems worth 
pursuing. This ultimately depends on its views concerning which features of 
society are open to change. In other terms, it depends on the, often implicit, 
asumptions that underlie the economic theory it resorts to.

2 Double movement and bounded change

In order to adequately frame the problem consider K. Polanyi’s (1957) defi-
nition of the economy in its substantive sense: it is “The interchange with his 
[man’s] natural and social environment, insofar as this results in supplying 
him with the means of material want-satisfaction.” (p. 243). According to 
Polanyi, the market economy is a specific type of economy, based on con-
tracted exchange. Like other economic setups it must ensure the material 
reproduction of society, its persistence over time. It does so through a price 
system which acts as a self-coordinating instance for economic activities.

The economy is a part of society. The social - as opposed to merely 
material - reproduction of society requires that market values and societal 
values be consistent. It is this external consistency between the economy and 
society that Polanyi referred to with his notion of embeddedness. However 
it is in the nature of the market to move towards complete autonomy and 
self regulation.\(^1\) This contrasts with the irreducibility of nature and human 
beings to commodities. Any attempt to continue in this direction would lead 
to a social catastrophe. External inconsistency may therefore determine an 
opposition to the rationale of the market and cause what Polanyi termed the 
”double movement” whereby the movement in favor of a self-regulating

\(^1\)Hodgson’s (1988, 1999) impurity principle points to the impracticability of a market 
based on pure (contracted) exchange. In this perspective it is important to stress that, 
according to Polanyi, the market’s drive towards self regulation (thus pure exchange) is 
ever fully achieved because of the protective responses it determines (Rodrigues 2004). 
Nevertheless, contracted exchange is the (albeit contradictory) rationale underlying the 
above drive towards self regulation, which suggests that a continuous distinction between 
market and exchange is of marginal importance for what follows.
market is contrasted by a counter-movement in favor of a self-protecting society. Block (2000/2001) provides a vivid illustration of the need for the double movement: "one might say that disembedding the market is similar to stretching a giant elastic band. Efforts to bring about greater autonomy of the market increase the level of tension. With further stretching, either the band will snap - representing social disintegration - or the economy will revert to a more embedded position.” (p. 9).

The double movement, however, contrasts business - or sections of it - and this way affects society’s material and social reproduction. In some instances it may even lead to a catastrophic outcome. Indeed, fascism according to Polanyi arose because the double movement proved to be disruptive (Polanyi 1957, ch. 7). If we push Bloch’s analogy to its extremes, one might suggest that re-embedding the market may also lead to a breaking point. Thus, the issue that arises is how we are to avoid both ”snaps”.

A pragmatic approach might be to rely on moderation. The problem, here, is what moderation consists in. For instance, is the commodification of workers acceptable provided they are paid a fair wage? Is fairness a societal or economic value? How does a fair wage relate to a market compatible wage? Can the latter be assessed? An answer to these questions would be fairly easy if the market was conceived of as the coordinating mechanism that conventional economists have in mind. According to this view, the internal consistency of the price mechanism is a necessary condition for the material reproduction of society. Societal values (e.g. equity) may be pursued but this usually involves a loss in efficiency, measured in terms of a trade off. Thus, any action is possible but at a cost that the market itself determines. The greater the thrust towards non market societal values, the more likely it is that the economy will be unable to ensure the material reproduction of society.

This is not Polanyi’s view. He argues that the market is not the only type of economy available: reciprocity and redistribution may either substitute or complement it. Market constraints need not constitute absolute impediments to the achievement of societal goals: alternative economic setups are possible. In fact, redistribution does occur in modern welfare states and reciprocity is a key feature of a variety of activities ranging from charities to political parties. Thus, the issue is how the co-existence of contracted exchange with these forms of economic integration affects the relation between internal and external consistency. In other terms, can the 'interference' of redistribution and reciprocity affect the market’s self-coordination?

---

2This does not imply, however, that alternative setups are a priori preferable to exchange, nor does it imply that they can be easily established.
3 Choice and the learning process

In a conventional (neoclassical) setting a market is supposed to collect and diffuse information on the relative scarcity of resources and on individual preferences. Undifferentiated actors need to choose on the basis of the information they gather from the market. They do so by maximizing, which requires that they choose in a substantively - in Simon’s (1988) sense - rational way. The problem with this approach is that the limited mental capability of human beings precludes their ability to choose in a substantively rational way, except in very special cases (Simon 1972). In general, a different approach to choice is called for. Following Simon’s suggestion (ibid.) let us focus on the implications of procedural rationality.

Choice involves the existence of a goal, which - owing to bounded rationality - may not be clearly identified at the outset ("I want to buy a car" rather than "I want to buy model X of brand Y"). The identification of the goal is strictly related to the choice set that is available (what automobile models are available? How much can I afford to spend? How long can I keep on searching?). How these issues are dealt with - i.e. how the overall problem is framed - involves the use of existing knowledge, which provides the lens through which an actor perceives reality. Existing knowledge also provides a framework to assess whether a problem may be deemed analogous to others which were solved according to a specific procedure: heuristics are generally based on such experience. Previously acquired knowledge therefore provides a scaffolding to support further knowledge (Newell, Simon, Shaw 1958).

The implication is that, since each individual is subject to specific experiences, learning is - at least to some extent - an idiosyncratic process. Thus, there is no absolute criterion to process the information that prices provide. Even if contracted exchange were to effectively transmit information throughout the economy, that same data would be interpreted in different ways and different interpretations would feed back on that very data. Contrary to the claims of conventional theory, the market cannot achieve internal consistency on the basis of information alone. Following Simon’s contribution to economic thought, knowledge and interpretative frameworks - as opposed to information processing - are a key element if we wish to understand economic behavior and choice.\footnote{Institutions are usually claimed to provide guidelines in a world of uncertainty and are supposed to complement the market in its coordinating function (North 1990). Institutions, however, need to be understood, i.e. interpreted. A signpost is not enough if it is not subject to a common - or mutually compatible - interpretation. Similarly, economic institutions require a common interpretative background. Although loose coupling allows for some inconsistencies, which in turn allow change to occur (Loasby 1991), a common}
Overall knowledge includes tacit as well as explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is what we know that we know and what we know that we do not know (Rooney et al. 2003). Tacit knowledge, in turn, is all the background knowledge that supports explicit knowledge, thus all those things an actor may be unaware of but without which she would be unable to actually understand reality. By being tacitly accepted, this knowledge avoids her the effort to continuously reassess what she already (believes she) understood. Since it is taken for granted, it is also one of those aspects of knowledge that is hardly questioned.\(^4\) It often includes the beliefs - i.e. explicit or implicit assumptions concerning reality - that actors resort to when they must formulate decisions but lack the required information or are unable to fit the information they have within the knowledge they have.\(^5\)

Three implications are worth pointing out. First, in order for a market to coordinate economic activity, and to be internally consistent, actors must interpret that information and the interpretative frameworks they use must be mutually compatible. Since interpretative frameworks arise out of available knowledge, how the market functions ultimately depends on society’s shared knowledge.

The second implication is that the distinction that the conventional approach would draw between external and internal consistency is not as clear cut as one might think. External consistency - the compatibility between societal values and economic outcomes - and internal consistency - the compatibility between the economic choices of all the actors involved - both depend on the interpretative frameworks that individuals resort to. Ultimately, they depend on society’s knowledge. It is doubtful that the latter can be split into two independent sections: the economic and the non-economic one.

The third implication is that society may avoid being disrupted by the double movement only if it shares a common view of what its goals are. In terms of both economic and societal coordination, what is required is that society’s knowledge act as a meta-coordinating instance.

\(^4\)What I am referring to is what M. Polanyi (1962) denotes ”the whole system of acceptances that are logically prior to any particular assertion of our own, prior to holding any particular piece of knowledge.” (p. 267). Following this perspective, tacit knowledge is not just uncodified information.

\(^5\)In this perspective overall knowledge is tantamount to culture, i.e. to the shared view that actors have of the world they live in.
4 Shared knowledge as a meta-coordinating device

The issues discussed in the previous section will be clearer by considering business behavior, i.e. by focusing on the distinguishing element of a capitalist market. Business generally pursues a profit by hiring workers, producing goods and selling them to customers. Customers must know the characteristics of the goods. When they do not, they need to learn. In some instances learning is straightforward: in most countries people eat bread, so they search for it, they try different types and they eventually choose which one they prefer. There are instances, however, where people need to be informed about the very existence of a good. This typically occurs when a new product is introduced in the market. There are still other instances where information is not enough. The features of a good may be difficult to appreciate, owing to technical complexity or because the potential buyer cannot easily understand how the good is supposed to satisfy her needs. Thus, firms may sell their products only if their potential customers have both the appropriate information and the interpretative framework to appreciate that information. In most cases it is up to the firms to provide both. They have all to gain from doing so.

Competition among firms allows more information to be circulated. Since each firm wishes to show that its good is better than others, potential customers are in a better condition to make comparisons. Competition, however, does not always allow customers to identify appropriate interpretative frameworks. While a pharmaceutical firm will try to prove that the drug it manufactures is better than its competitor’s drug, no firm will care to provide information or a cognitive framework that takes into account prevention as opposed to cure (unless there is something to gain from prevention as well). Public debate over the quality of the goods occurs within an interpretative framework that is consistent with the profit constraint of the firms involved.

Truly, while drug producers may not be concerned with prevention, other firms - e.g. those that deal with environmental issues - may have an interest in dealing with it. Thus, as the range of industries potentially involved grows, the information that is circulated increases and the interpretative framework becomes more comprehensive. This would seem to be the case where the market provides the required shared knowledge that coordination requires. Note, however, that in the most favorable of conditions the available interpretative framework will be one where all the profitable opportunities are taken account of. All interpretative frameworks that transcend the bounds set out by the profit motive will be missing.
Knowledge, however, does not depend only on economic choice, with its related problem solving activities. The boundaries provided by the profit constraint are irrelevant for a great many problem solving activities. Learning may simply consist in making sense of something, independently of any direct application to choice. In fact, an individual may choose not to define boundaries too strictly or even to change them as she goes about learning. This may occur both in strictly scientific research\(^6\) as well as in making sense of life and choosing how to conduct it. It is also the case with Veblen's notion of idle learning.

Extra-economic interpretative frameworks may therefore arise independently of learning processes that are associated to economic choice. At the same time, however, these extra-economic interpretative frameworks may feed back on economic decisions. This is the case when ethical considerations lead to restrictions on economic activity, as with child labor or working time.\(^7\)

These considerations on knowledge suggests that, contrary to Hayek (1949, p. 80), "the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place" that a consumer has is not all she needs to choose appropriately. She may well want to take more general features of knowledge into account. Thus, she may believe that the metric that is required to assess economic welfare need not be the same that is required to assess social well being (Sen 1999).\(^8\)

Under the above circumstances it is important to investigate what happens when different interpretative frameworks - e.g. market and non-market - clash. Typical cases are when workers within a firm base their claim for a higher share of income on ethical principles (e.g. the human right to a decent standard of living) or when client firms - those that carry out complementary (upstream or downstream) activities with the firm under exam - also claim a higher share in distribution (e.g. on the grounds of fair pricing).

Since claims by other parties are likely to contrast the profit goal of a firm, the latter will have to react. Under these circumstances, the division of labor within the firm as well as among firms may be assigned a 'political' task. In the first instance the organization of production may have to be

\(^{6}\) M. Polanyi (1962) mentions the case of research in Mathematics as one where the goals and the boundaries of the problems to be solved change as advances in the discipline occur.

\(^{7}\) In this perspective, the potential conflict that A. Sen (1982) points out, between (economic) preferences and (ethical) meta-preferences, is possible precisely because different interpretative frameworks co-exist.

\(^{8}\) If different metrics exist, it is likely that - contrary to Coase (1988) - social costs, which are measured in terms of social well being, cannot be internalized in the price mechanism, which relates to economic welfare (Kapp 1963a; b). The similarities between K. Polanyi and K.W. Kapp are highlighted by Swaney and Evers (1989).
devised in such a way that the other parties do not have the bargaining power to claim higher distributive shares. A further step is to avoid even the insurgence of a distributional conflict: the parties would have to feel that the status quo is either the only or the best achievable one. These two situations are what Gramsci refers to as control and consensus respectively. Control occurs when the parties would want to realize an alternative but cannot. It has to do with the balance of power among the actors. Consensus implies that the actors do not think an alternative is possible. This has to do with what they know and how they know. If the division of labor is devised so that workers or client firms do not know how economic activities are being carried out, this prevents actors from envisaging possible alternatives to the status quo (Marglin 1978; Ramazzotti 2004).

The above example suggests that the establishment of an interpretative framework does not occur through propaganda (e.g. advertisements) alone. It depends on what people can learn, which depends on how markets are organized and on how production is organized. The institutionalization of consumption and working patterns determines an important part of the world actors live in. Insofar as these patterns persist over time, they tend to be taken for granted. Rather than being potentially subject to questioning, they become a part of tacit knowledge: they point to what is "socially" possible or appropriate (Zucker 1977).9 From this perspective, they provide the conditions for external consistency.

These considerations apply to what actors deem technically possible. Technology generally is the outcome - through innovation - of a problem solving process, which depends on a more or less defined goal - e.g. finding a cure for malaria - and on boundaries that circumscribe the problem. Aside from available knowledge, a boundary is generally provided by the profit constraint, whereby the innovation must eventually ensure a return. From a business perspective only potentially profitable technologies are worth seeking. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that, owing to the prevailing distribution of world income, research in goods associated to conspicuous consumption in industrialized countries is going to be livelier and more profitable than research that tries to find appropriate drugs for tropical diseases.10 Although unexpected innovations are always possible, as the unintended con-

9This is what Scott (1995) refers to as the cognitive pillar of institutions.
10The relation between these considerations and Polanyi’s approach is pointed out by Cangiani (2003:337): "The starting point in Polanyi’s essay is that in a market economy [] the economic system tends to be self-referential. Since the choices and the very selection of information are determined or biased by ‘the principle of gain and profit’, ‘economic’ efficiency cannot be immediately and in general considered as coinciding with efficiency from the point of view of society."
sequences of economic action, when technological evolution is subject to the profit constraint it entails an overall pattern of innovation - thus technological paradigms and trajectories - that reflects privatistic, rather than social, priorities. Technological paradigms and trajectories, in turn, favor some institutional setups while precluding others.

Conventional theory acknowledges that science and technology are, at least in some instances, public goods: single economic actors may not find it convenient to engage in research even though they might all gain from scientific and technological progress.\textsuperscript{11} The policy implication is that public funding - based on redistribution rather than exchange - may be necessary. The discussion above leads to somewhat similar conclusions. It suggests that the pattern of technological development depends on the kind of research that is carried out - i.e. what questions are asked - and that the latter depends on what priorities are selected.\textsuperscript{12} In the standard public good case, the priority is collective (and, one might suggest, long term) profitability or growth. In the case here discussed, the priority is a social welfare that transcends profit, even though it need not preclude it.\textsuperscript{13}

Technology is a major determinant of the institutional setup of society. It determines the technical conditions for profitable economic activity. It also provides interpretative frameworks. In terms of production processes, workers and firms cannot expect to carry out their tasks in a manner which is deemed "technically" inappropriate. In terms of output, consumers can ask for only what is available; they cannot demand what is deemed "technically" impossible to produce. Ultimately, technology is an important component of shared knowledge. Contrary to conventional views, it provides the conditions for, rather than the constraints to, both internal and external consistency.

\section{Policymaking and knowledge}

Let us now return to the consistency issue. I already argued that there is a wide range of possible economic arrangements, depending on how reciprocity, redistribution and contracted exchange interact. In order for consistency to occur both within the economy and between the economy and society, actors must share a common view of how the economy and society are (and should

\textsuperscript{11}This is particularly so with basic - as opposed to applied - research.\textsuperscript{12}K.W Kapp (1976) noted that efficiency in agriculture is usually measured in terms of output per working hour or of output per hectare whereas in some important instances it would be more appropriate to measure it in terms of output per unit of energy.\textsuperscript{13}Independently of what generates it, once technological progress changes relative prices, new business opportunities arise, thereby enhancing the production of some goods rather than others and the use of some production processes rather than others.
be) arranged, what I referred to as shared knowledge. This knowledge is strongly affected by institutions, such as the division of labor or consumption patterns, which generally reflect the interests of business.

The double movement reflects a breach in a society’s shared knowledge. It consists in a pressure to change the existing combination of reciprocity, redistribution and contracted exchange. In so doing, it is most likely to clash with vested interests. What deserves attention, however, is that it may also clash with those elements of shared knowledge that are not being questioned. Three cases are worth pointing out. First, at a strictly economic level. it may change the business outlook (expectations): new claims on how to run the economy may increase uncertainty as to what conducts should and will prevail and what performance will result. In other terms, the degree of turbulence of the economy may be expected to rise, all other things given. This may negatively affect accumulation and growth. Second, at the institutional level, it may undermine established views which are believed to be at the roots of existing society. Consider, for instance, how restrictions on traffic or smoking may be interpreted as detrimental to individual freedom. Third, at the technology level, it may be deemed inconsistent with the technical requirements for economic activity.

Different types of change are possible, under these circumstances, depending on how actors relate to the above elements. They may accept the economic, institutional and technological contexts as general bounds. Alternatively, they may act upon these general features in order to change them. The first approach implies that change only consists in economic and societal adaptation to external shocks and to endogenous (spontaneous) evolution. Basically, it considers the status quo as improvable only at the margin. The second approach considers the existing economic and societal setup as only one out of a range of possible ones. Between these two extremes lies a range of intermediate approaches, which are distinguished in terms of what is deemed exogenous, i.e. not subject to purposeful change.

Far from relying on a demiurgical act of will, the second approach - which we might call progressive change - assumes that change is possible but that it does not consist in merely deciding - possibly through elections - that a different society must be organized. It acknowledges that the reactions of social interests, constraints arising from social rigidity and technological path dependence may prevent change. These constraints to change may occur on "technical" grounds, in that the economic, institutional and technological contexts may require time to adapt to the new requirements that emerge from society. They may do so on cognitive grounds: actors must make sense of whatever change the economy and society undergo. From this perspective, it is important to stress that awareness that change is possible is not the result
of a merely intellectual process. Economic and societal coordination requires a fairly consistent interpretative framework, which cannot arise other than through the interaction between economic and institutional change on the one hand and learning on the other. Thus, change has to do with a societal reassessment of the knowledge that is embedded in technology, in institutions and in the resulting beliefs that underlie common sense.

Policymaking is necessary to ensure that internal and external consistency is achieved. But these consistencies depend on shared knowledge, thus on the image of a different societal setup - including societal goals - that gradually emerges. The scope for policymaking, therefore, is to establish a specific knowledge framework, i.e. an interpretative framework of reality whereby the status quo is not taken for granted but may be progressively changed. In turn, policymaking can enhance actual change only by feeding upon what social actors deem necessary as well as possible.

Progressive policymaking is, in this perspective, a special type of action because it needs to focus on the creation of new knowledge as a meta-coordinating instance. While it may involve specific technical measures, its general goal is not strictly technical: it consists in enhancing people’s awareness that change is actually possible. It is this awareness that allows all individuals to carry out a search process to identify where and how it is possible to act on the economy and on society. It is this same awareness that makes them receptive of whatever change is actually occurring.

Policy makers and (sections of) the community need to interact if progressive change is to come about. This may not occur, however. Policy makers may reflect vested interests or the interpretative frameworks that defend those interests. Policy may therefore restrict the potential for a different outlook on society. Similarly, the extant shared knowledge framework may preclude people from envisaging change. There apparently is no way to predict what path society may eventually follow but the very openness of the learning process, its irreducibility to a mere business outlook, suggests that societal change need not be bound by the latter.

6 Final remarks

In a society where different groups of economic actors are characterized by distinct interests, learning occurs in different ways, that is to say, it is centered on different goals and it reflects different ways to frame a problem. Owing to the central role that knowledge plays, it is in the interest of each party to affect learning and knowledge so as to exert control over, or achieve the consensus of, other parties. Firms act on knowledge both when they
interact with their potential customers and when they interact with workers and other firms.

What is at issue is not the distortion of truth but the viewpoint chosen, thus the priorities assigned. As far as firms are concerned, their priority is profit. Alternative priorities may relate to strictly economic issues, such as distribution, or to issues which are generally not viewed as strictly economic - e.g. gender issues, environmental issues, world poverty, and peace - but eventually affect the way economic relations are structured.

Progressive change, i.e. change that is not restricted within the bounds of exchange and its associated business interests, involves the interaction between policy makers and (sections of) the community. In this perspective, policy makers must enhance a general outlook of society whereby change is possible. They must favor attempts to envisage different economic and societal setups. In turn, the measures they take, to change the economy and its institutions, have to be consistent with the overall view of a possible society that emerges out of society itself.

This suggests that progressive policy is a sort of non-technocratic paternalism. It is non-technocratic because it acknowledges that its action is based on priorities and constraints that are cognitive as well as technical. It is paternalistic because it has to enhance full awareness through learning processes, and the appropriateness of these processes depends on the interaction between public policy and the knowledge related policy of other actors, primarily business.

The general conclusion of the above discussion is that formal democracy is a necessary but definitely not a sufficient requirement for progressive change. A double movement in cognition is also required, which considers learning as a manifold process, based on the institutional setup of a society. This paper only provides an outline of why this is so. Hopefully, further research will provide a more in-depth understanding of how it can occur. A possible step in this direction may be to extend the above inquiry to the multiplicity of collective agents that make up a community, thereby overcoming the implicitly assumed dualism between policymakers and society.

References


mimeographed copy).


